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Abstract
The empirical research literature regarding the eﬀects of market structure on small business
lending has yielded ambiguous results. This paper empirically tests for the presence of coun-
tervailing eﬀects of increases in market concentration on small business loan volume. Coun-
tervailing eﬀects would be expected if both the traditional Structure, Conduct, Performance
(SCP) paradigm of industrial organization and a paradigm whereby market power beneﬁts the
formation of lending relationships (the relationship hypothesis), are at work. Using Community
Reinvestment Act (CRA) data on small loans to small businesses, it is found that, on average,
across MSAs, SCP eﬀects dominate. But, as predicted by the relationship hypothesis, the neg-
ative eﬀects of increases in concentration on small business loan volume are weaker, the greater
the presence of young ﬁrms and the higher the business failure rate. Relationship eﬀects due
to business failure appear to come from highly concentrated MSAs. Endogeneity concerns are
further addressed with the estimation of a regression that separates out the eﬀects of changes
in the number of lenders from the eﬀects of changes in the sum of squared deviations of market
shares.
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11 Introduction
Small businesses are a vital part of the U.S. economy. According to the Small Business Admin-
istration, small businesses employ roughly half of the nation’s workers. In addition, it is thought
that small business investment plays an important role in business cycle ﬂuctuations.
Evidence from the Federal Reserve’s 1998 Survey of Small Business Finances suggests that
bank ﬁnancing is very important for small businesses, especially for young ﬁrms (Robb (2002)).1
In addition, it appears that the lending process can become disrupted as a result of bank mergers;
a 2004 survey indicated that among small businesses that have gone through a merger with their
bank, 26 percent switched their banking business to another institution (Julavits (2004)).
This paper investigates how small business loan volumes are aﬀected by small business lending
market structure. In other bank product markets, notably mortgage lending and retail deposit
markets, researchers have found empirical evidence that higher market concentration is positively
and signiﬁcantly correlated with higher prices and/or higher bank proﬁts. (See, for example, Rosen
(2003), Pilloﬀ and Rhoades (2002), Rhoades (1992), and Berger and Hannan (1989).)2.
Results regarding the relationship between market structure and small business lending have
been more ambiguous. Studies of the eﬀect of bank size on small business lending have tended to
suggest that larger banks, and, by extension, more concentrated markets, are associated with less
small business lending. In contrast, direct studies of the relationship between market structure and
small business loan volumes have found that more concentrated markets are associated with more
small business lending (Zarutskie (2003) and DeYoung et al. (1999)). Studies of the eﬀects of bank
mergers on small business lending have yielded mixed results.
This paper empirically tests for the presence of two kinds of eﬀects of increases in concentration
on the volume of small business lending, using MSA level data collected from bank reports ﬁled
in compliance with the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA). The ﬁrst eﬀect is the traditional
1A 2004 survey by the National Federation for Independent Business Research Foundation suggested that small
businesses as a whole do not rank the ability to obtain credit high among their concerns. However, the same survey
also suggested that young small businesses are more concerned about ﬁnancing than older small businesses. (Marcuss
(2004)).
2Some researchers have even linked weak competition in banking markets to real outcomes, not just ﬁnancial
eﬀects (Cetorelli (2004); Cetorelli and Strahan (2004); Garmaise and Moscowitz (2004); and Rajan and Zingales
(1998))
2Structure Conduct Performance (SCP) eﬀect of industrial organization, whereby an increase in
market concentration decreases competition and, thereby, small business loan volume. The second
is a "relationship eﬀect,"as modeled by Petersen and Rajan (1995): in a world with asymmetric
information and moral hazard, an increase in market power increases banks’ incentives to form
lending relationships with young ﬁrms with relatively poor prospects.
I ﬁnd that, on average, across MSAs, SCP eﬀects dominate. But, as predicted by the relationship
hypothesis, the negative eﬀects of increases in concentration on small business loan volume are
weaker, the greater the presence of young ﬁrms in the MSA and the higher the ﬁrm failure rate.
However, results also suggest that while SCP eﬀects and relationship eﬀects associated with ﬁrm
age are the same no matter the level of concentration, relationship eﬀects associated with ﬁrm
failure appear only in highly concentrated markets. Estimates based on an alternative speciﬁcation
that uses the number of lenders and the sum of squared deviations of market shares instead of the
HHI support the view that the presence of SCP eﬀects is not merely the result of endogeneity bias.
2 Related Literature
Two broad strands of literature relate to the relationship between market structure and the volume
of small business lending. One strand examines the eﬀects of banking industry consolidation,
either indirectly, through studying the role of bank size in small business lending, or directly,
through studying the eﬀects of mergers. Numerous researchers have found that larger banks are
less likely to lend to small businesses than smaller banks, which lends at least qualitative support
to the SCP hypothesis (Avery and Samolyk (2004), Sapienza (2002), Berger et al. (2001), and
Levonian and Soller (1996)). However, studies of the eﬀects of mergers on small business lending
have yielded mixed results, with some evidence that mergers reduce lending to small businesses
and other evidence of the opposite. Sapienza (2002) and Avery and Samolyk (2004) ﬁnd that
it is important to take account of the sizes of the merging banks. Similarly, Berger et al. (1998)
emphasize the importance of the time horizon, stressing that short-run eﬀects of mergers may diﬀer
from long-run eﬀects.
Two papers have examined directly the eﬀects of market concentration on small business loan
3volumes, as I do in this paper. These papers suggest that, in contrast to SCP, there is a positive
correlation between concentration and small business lending. Zarutskie (2003) used balance sheet
and income statement data, including information on bank loans, as reported by a sample of young,
small corporations to the IRS. She found that increases in concentration, measured using deposits
at branches in the MSA in which the ﬁrms were headquartered, were associated with increases in
the ﬁrms’ ratios of bank debt to assets. However, this eﬀect disappeared after the enactment of
the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Eﬃciency Act of 1994. DeYoung et al. (1999)
focused on the tendency of young banks to make small business loans and how that tendency
changes as a bank ages. However, among their results was the ﬁnding that young, small banks
make more loans under $1,000,000 when deposit market concentration increases in the MSA in
which the bank is headquartered.
Both Zarutskie and DeYoung et. al. cite a theoretical model presented by Petersen and Rajan
(1995) in support of their empirical ﬁndings. In Petersen and Rajan’s model, asymmetric infor-
mation and moral hazard generate a need for banks to build relationships with borrowers, yielding
what I will call a "relationship eﬀect" of increases in market concentration.
Petersen and Rajan model two types of young ﬁrms—high quality young ﬁrms, who can choose
between a safe project with a certain but low return, or a risky project, with an uncertain, but
higher, return. In contrast, low quality young ﬁrms have no prospect of success at all; all of the
projects of low quality young ﬁrms return nothing. The quality of a ﬁrm is unknown to a bank,
but the probability of its being high quality is known.
Petersen and Rajan argue that banks with more market power can better aﬀord to set the low
interest rates that are required to get high quality young ﬁrms to invest in safe projects rather than
gambling the bank’s money on risky projects. This is because banks with more market power can
better compensate for the low initial interest rate with a high rate in subsequent periods, when the
bank knows more about the ﬁrm and its projects.3 Because banks with more market power are
more likely to be able to engage in this intertemporal cross-subsidization, they can better aﬀord to
lend to young ﬁrms with a higher probability of being low quality. Banks with market power can
3Formally, Petersen and Rajan model this gain in knowledge by requiring that all period-two projects are safe
projects.
4make their expected payoﬀ from lending to ﬁrms that turn out to be high quality high enough to
compensate for the losses that will come from lending to ﬁrms that turn out to be low quality.
Petersen and Rajan used ﬁrm-level data from the Survey of Small Business Finances and cat-
egorical deposit market concentration measures to show that, as concentration in the MSA where
the small business is headquartered increases discontinuously from perfectly competitive levels,
interest rates for loans to young ﬁrms decline. They also ﬁnd that, as ﬁrms age, the eﬀect of
concentration on interest rates becomes less negative and then becomes positive. They point out
that, strictly speaking, their theoretical model does not necessarily predict their empirical results.
Their model predicts that concentration should be negatively correlated with loan rates only for
the lowest quality young ﬁrms, not necessarily for the average quality young ﬁrm. They do not
examine interest rates for the lowest quality young ﬁrms. In contrast, I will include measures of
small business quality as well as age in my analysis, allowing me to do just that.
In their empirical work, Petersen and Rajan ﬁnd relationship eﬀects, for younger small busi-
nesses. But, although they don’t highlight the point, their results also reveal the presence of SCP
eﬀects, for older small businesses. The empirical presence of two countervailing eﬀects of increases
in concentration on small business lending is consistent with the presence of ambiguity in the
empirical results of the related literature overall.
One of the purposes of this paper is to investigate whether the same dichotomy of eﬀects of
increases in concentration that appeared in Petersen and Rajan’s work, for discrete changes in
concentration and ﬁrm level data, can be found for continuous changes in concentration and MSA
level data. It is at an aggregated level that analysis of the competitive eﬀects of proposed bank
mergers and acquisitions takes place.4 And, if eﬀects diﬀer depending on the age of the small
business, what are they on average for MSAs? As Petersen and Rajan point out, their regression
estimates, all of which incorporate full age-concentration interaction eﬀects, do not say whether, in
highly concentrated markets, the lower interest rates for younger ﬁrms are outweighed by higher
interest rates for older ﬁrms.
In addition, do eﬀects diﬀer also by the quality of the small business and, to adhere even more
4The Federal Reserve analyzes the competitive eﬀects of proposed bank mergers using Federal Reserve Banking
markets. For urban areas, these markets often are comparable to MSAs.
5closely to the theoretical model as presented by Petersen and Rajan themselves, by whether the
small business is both young and poor quality? Finally, do aggregate eﬀects diﬀer depending on
the level of concentration.
3 Data
I will address these questions using measures of concentration based on small business loans, not
deposits. The distinction is important because smaller banks have a larger ratio of small business
loans to assets than do larger banks. In addition, smaller banks tend to have a larger ratio of
deposits to assets. Therefore, banks’ small business lending shares will not, in general, equal their
deposit market shares. In contrast to DeYoung et al. (1999), who use loans under $1 million
to any business, I use CRA reported loans under $1 million to businesses with revenues under
$1 million, thereby focusing on small loans to small businesses.5 Small loans to small businesses
are the appropriate focus for tests for the presence of relationship eﬀects associated with market
concentration. Borrowers in my sample include partnerships and sole proprietorships, as well as
older ﬁrms, and banks are of all sizes and ages.
I use a repeated cross section of CRA small business lending data for 2003 and 2004, and
analysis of the eﬀect of concentration on the volume of small business lending is at the Metropolitan
Statistical Area (MSA) level. On the CRA report, banks give the number and total dollar amount
of loans less than $1,000,000 to businesses with gross annual revenues less than $1,000,000 (small
business loans).6 Banks report loan totals by census tract of the headquarters of the borrower or
by the census tract where the majority of the funds are being used. I aggregate from the census
tract level to the MSA level.7 Commercial and industrial loans (loans for a business purpose that
are not secured by real estate), commercial real estate loans (loans that are secured by commercial
5DeYoung et al. (1999)use data on loans under $1,000,000 from the Call Report, not from the CRA.
6During the period under study here, only banks with assets of at least $250 million and banks that were in a
holding company with at least $1 billion in assets reported on the CRA. Therefore, following previous research, for
banks that do not meet the CRA reporting requirement criteria, I have estimated small business lending by MSA by
using Call Report data. Speciﬁcally, I have allocated total small business lending as reported on the Call Report to
diﬀerent MSAs in proportion to the bank’s share of the bank’s total deposits in that MSA.
7MSA designations use the 2003 Oﬃce of Management and Budget deﬁnitions. If the MSA has Metropolitan
Divisions within it, the analysis is at the Metropolitan Division level.
6real estate), and loans through a business credit card all are considered business loans for CRA
reporting purposes.8 Consistent with prior research, I exclude the loans of credit card banks from
my sample.9
The Hirschman-Herﬁndahl Index (HHI) is a measure of market concentration and is the sum of
squared market shares, where the market shares are expressed as percents. As mentioned above, in
contrast to prior research, I measure market shares for the HHI using small loans to small businesses
The number of small businesses is included as a control for small business loan demand. The
number of businesses, by revenue category, MSA, and year, is from Dun and Bradstreet. I also
include the population of the MSA, average annual payroll employment growth for the MSA from
1995 to 2000, and average annual payroll employment growth from year t − 2 to year t + 1 as
demand controls.10 All of these control variables are meant to reduce the standard errors of the
estimated equations. Small business counts and population also are controls for market size. The
regression equation needs controls for market size because, empirically, the HHI is highly negatively
correlated with market size, and market size is of course positively correlated with the dependent
variable.
Payroll employment growth should help reduce possible downward bias of the coeﬃcient on
concentration by helping to control for general economic conditions. MSAs where employment
is growing more quickly may have small businesses that are growing more quickly and therefore
8Banks report business credit card lines of credit , whether drawn on or not, on the CRA. In contrast, personal
credit card lines of credit, even if used for business purposes (for example, lines through a small business owner’s
personal credit card), are not reported on the CRA.
9I deﬁne credit card banks to include commercial banks that have a ratio of total consumer loans to assets of at
least 0.5 and a ratio of personal credit card loans to total consumer loans of at least 0.9, as of the fourth quarter
of 2003. (As of the fourth quarter of 2001, the mean ratio of credit card loans to consumer loans across all banks
reporting on the Call Report was 0.03, the median less than 0.01.) The deﬁnition of a credit card bank also includes
any bank that has a ratio of personal credit card loans to consumer loans of at least 0.9 and meets at least one of the
following criteria: it is reported by the Nilson Report as being among the top 50 banks in terms of credit card loans
outstanding in 2003 or its main activity, as indicated by the Federal Reserve’s National Information Center, is credit
card issuance.
In addition, I deﬁne as credit card banks these banks that are reported by the Nilson Report as being among the
top 50: Chase Manhattan Bank U.S.A., N.A., DE (ratio of credit card loans to consumer loans of 0.8) and MBNA
America Bank, N.A., DE (0.7).
Finally, based on conversations with representatives of the following institutions or state government supervisory
agency representatives, I exclude these additional "business credit card" banks: MBNA America Delaware, N.A., DE;
Universal Financial Corporation, UT; Mill Creek Bank, UT; Advanta Bank Corp., UT; Volvo Commercial Credit
Corp., Utah, UT; Wright Express FS Corp., UT; Pitney Bowes Bank, UT; and Capital One, F.S.B., VA.
10MSA population ﬁgures are estimates for year t.
7seeking more bank ﬁnancing. At the same time, MSAs where employment is growing more quickly
may attract bank entry, which would tend to decrease concentration. Employment growth from
1995 to 2000 is a relatively long-term average that excludes the March-November 2001 recession.
Employment growth from year t − 2 to t + 1 reﬂects more current economic conditions as well as
incorporating a forward looking element to capture small ﬁrms’ views of likely business prospects
into the near-term future.
I also include the size of small businesses and the age of small businesses as demand-side control
variables. Bitler et al. (2001) present evidence from the Federal Reserve System’s Survey of Small
Business Finances (SSBF) that small businesses with annual revenue greater than $50,000 are more
likely to have a bank relationship. (The size of small businesses also is a scale variable.) In addition,
the SSBF indicates that small businesses with a current owner tenure of more than four years are
more likely to have a bank relationship.11 I use the Dun and Bradstreet business counts by revenue
subcategory of under $1,000,000 and the Dun and Bradstreet business counts by revenue, current
owner tenure, MSA, and year to measure small business size and age, respectively. I also use the
Dun and Bradstreet business counts by years since incorporation, MSA, and year to measure ﬁrm
age.12
I include a number of variables to test for the presence of relationship eﬀects. As just men-
tioned, ﬁrm age variables are included as demand-side control variables. When I am testing for
relationship eﬀects, these variables also enter interacted with concentration. The proxies for ﬁrm
quality that I use are the MSA unemployment rate, the MSA business failure rate, and a dummy
variable indicating whether the MSA is in the bottom quartile of the MSA median family income
distribution. I derive the business failure rate from the Dun and Bradstreet data.13
To address remaining concerns regarding the possible endogeneity of market concentration, I
also estimate equations which exclude the HHI, but include the number of lenders and the sum of
11It is noted that the Survey of Small Business Finances deﬁnition of a small business is fewer than 500 employees,
rather than the CRA deﬁnition of annual revenue less than $1,000,000.
12The Dun and Bradstreet data do not include information on years since incorporation for small businesses, only
for all businesses.
13The Dun and Bradstreet data give business counts by years since incorporation category, MSA, and year. The
category indicating the youngest ﬁrms is ﬁrms zero to four years old. By assuming constant annual business formation
rates and failure rates for each MSA between 2000 and 2004, I am able to use the business counts in 2003 and 2004
and the number of businesses that are zero to four years old in 2004 to back out the ﬁrm failure rate for each MSA.
8squared deviations of market shares separately. I discuss this further in the next section.
Sample statistics are shown in Table 1.
4 Regression Speciﬁcations
4.1 Baseline Regressions
The dependent variable, SBL, is the log of the dollar volume of small business loans. All variables
are measured at the MSA level for year t. The main baseline regression, estimated using OLS, is:
SBL = α + β1HHI + β2SB + β3LGSB + β4POP + β5PEG9500
+ β6PEG3Y + β7FIRM AGE + ,
(4.1)
where HHIis the Hirschman-Herﬁndahl Index, SB is the log of the number of small businesses,
LGSB is the proportion of small businesses with gross annual revenue of at least $50,000, POP
is the log of population, PEG9500 is the average annual employment growth rate from 1995 to
2000, PEG3Y is the average annual employment growth rate from year t − 2 to year t + 1, and
FIRM AGE is the proportion of small businesses with current owner tenure of less than ﬁve years
or the proportion of all businesses incorporated less than ﬁve years.
To test for robustness of the results to inclusion of ﬁrm quality variables, a second baseline
regression includes, in addition to the variables in equation (4.1), FIRM QUALITY :
SBL = α + β1HHI + β2SB + β3LGSB + β4POP + β5PEG9500
+ β6PEG3Y + β7FIRM AGE + β8FIRM QUALITY + .
(4.2)
FIRM QUALITY is the unemployment rate, the ﬁrm failure rate, or a dummy variable indi-
cating that the MSA is in the lowest quartile for median family income.
4.2 Tests for relationship eﬀects
I estimate three types of regression equations to test for the presence of relationship eﬀects. The ﬁrst
type tests for the presence of relationship eﬀects due solely to ﬁrm age. In their paper, Petersen and
9Rajan tested for the presence of relationship eﬀects due solely to ﬁrm age. This type of regression
takes the form:
SBL = α + β1HHI + β2SB + β3LGSB + β4POP + β5PEG9500
+ β6PEG3Y + β7FIRM AGE + β8 (FIRMAGE)(HHI) + .
(4.3)
The second type of regression tests for the presence of relationship eﬀects due to ﬁrm age and
to ﬁrm quality. This type of regression takes the form:
SBL = α + β1HHI + β2SB + β3LGSB + β4POP + β5PEG9500
+ β6PEG3Y + β7FIRM AGE + β8 (FIRMAGE)(HHI)
+ β9FIRM QUALITY + β10 (FIRMQUALITY )(HHI) + .
(4.4)
Following Petersen and Rajan’s theoretical model, which emphasizes that relationship eﬀects
pertain to ﬁrms that are young and low quality, the third type of regression takes the form:
SBL = α + β1HHI + β2SB + β3LGSB + β4POP + β5PEG9500
+ β6PEG3Y + β7FIRM AGE + β8FIRM QUALITY
+ β9Y LQ + β10 (Y LQ)(HHI) + ,
(4.5)
where Y LQ is a dummy variable indicating that the MSA is in the top quartile for FIRM AGE
and, when FIRM QUALITY is the unemployment rate or the ﬁrm failure rate, is also in the
top quartile for FIRM QUALITY . (Recall that FIRM AGE and FIRMQUALITY actually
measure youth and low quality, increasing in value as ﬁrms become younger and as their quality
deteriorates, respectively.) When FIRM QUALITY is a dummy variable indicating whether or not
the MSA is in the lowest quartile for median family income, Y LQ requires that that dummy variable
equals one. Note that, in addition to Y LQ, I include both FIRM AGE and FIRM QUALITY
by themselves. This is because, as will be seen from the results shown below, FIRM AGE and
FIRM QUALITY are almost always statistically signiﬁcant. Y LQ is included by itself in addition
to in interaction with HHI so that any intercept shift resulting from Y LQ being equal to one is not
10erroneously attributed to a change in the slope with respect to HHI. In addition, the inclusion of
Y LQ by itself is analogous to the inclusion of FIRM AGE and FIRM QUALITY by themselves
in equations (4.3)and (4.4).
4.3 Tests for diﬀerential eﬀects by concentration level
Marginal eﬀects of increases in concentration on small business lending may be diﬀerent in uncon-
centrated or moderately concentrated markets than in highly concentrated markets. For example,
if there are very many lenders in the market and concentration is relatively low, one might suspect
that small increases in concentration would aﬀect small business lending very little, either through
SCP or through relationship eﬀects.
To test for diﬀerences in eﬀects by level of concentration, I estimate a set of regressions using
a dummy variable indicating whether the market is "highly concentrated," as deﬁned by the De-
partment of Justice. This dummy variable, HIHHI, is one if HHI >= 1,800. The speciﬁcation
to test for diﬀerences in average eﬀects is:
SBL = α + β1HHI + β2HIHHI + β3 (HHI)(HIHHI) + β4SB + β5LGSB
+ β6POP + β7PEG9500 + β8PEG3Y + β9FIRMAGE + .
(4.6)
The second speciﬁcation allows for full FIRM AGE and ﬁrm quality interaction eﬀects:
SBL = α + β1HHI + β2HIHHI + β3 (HHI)(HIHHI) + β4SB + β5LGSB
+ β6POP + β7PEG9500 + β8PEG3Y + β9FIRMAGE
+ β10 (FIRM AGE)(HHI) + β11 (FIRM AGE)(HIHHI)
+ β12 (FIRMAGE)(HHI)(HIHHI) + β13FIRMQUALITY
+ β14 (FIRM QUALITY )(HHI) + β15 (FIRM QUALITY )(HIHHI)
+ β16 (FIRM QUALITY )(HHI)(HIHHI) + .
(4.7)
114.4 Tests of share distribution eﬀects by concentration level
As mentioned in the last section, the inclusion of the demand control variables PEG9500 and
PEG3Y should help reduce possible downward bias of the coeﬃcient on concentration.
To address remaining concerns regarding the possible endogeneity of market concentration, I
also estimate equations which exclude the HHI, but, using the formula for the HHI, include the
number of lenders and the sum of squared deviations of market shares separately. Changes in
the distribution of market shares, holding the number of lenders constant, may be less subject to
endogeneity concerns. In particular, Ericson and Pakes (1995) present a model of industry dynamics
in which entry, exit, investment, and idiosyncratic shocks result in equilibria with heterogeneous
ﬁrm sizes. Diﬀerent shocks in diﬀerent markets could provide an exogenous source of variation in
concentration, even if the number of lenders is held constant.14
To separate out the eﬀects of changes in the number of lenders from changes in deviations of
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The regression to test the for the average eﬀect of changes in the sum of squared deviations on
small business loan volume is:
SBL = α + β1SSD + β2SCALE FACTOR + β3SB + β4LGSB + β5POP
+ β6PEG9500 + β7PEG3Y + β8FIRM AGE + ,
(4.10)
14Correlations between HHI and PEG9500 (-.19) and between SSD and PEG9500 (-.15), for example, are both
relatively low, but not completely negligible. However, within number of lender quartiles, the correlations between
SSD and PEG9500 are neither as large nor even consistently negative. From smallest to largest MSA, by number
of lenders, these correlations are -.01, -.13, .06, and .11.
12where SSD is the sum of squared deviations of the banks’ market shares from the mean and
SCALE FACTOR is 10,000/n.
I also estimate a set of equations with full ﬁrm age and quality interaction eﬀects:
SBL = α + β1SSD + β2SCALE FACTOR + β3SB + β4LGSB + β5POP
+ β6PEG9500 + β7PEG3Y + β8FIRM AGE
+ β9 (FIRM AGE)(SSD) + β10 (FIRM AGE)(SCALE FACTOR)
+ β11FIRM QUALITY + β12 (FIRM QUALITY )(SSD)




Regression results for equations (4.1) and (4.2) show that, on average, HHI has a negative and
almost always at least marginally statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect on small business loan volumes.
(Table 2.) Controlling for just ﬁrm age (columns I and II), a 100 point increase in the HHI
decreases small business loan volume by about half a percent. The one exception to statistical
signiﬁcance of the HHI coeﬃcient in Table 2 is in column III, where ﬁrm quality is measured by the
unemployment rate. As will be seen in Table 6, however, when the coeﬃcient on HHI is allowed
to vary by both years since incorporation and the unemployment rate, the coeﬃcient on HHI by
itself is statistically signiﬁcant.
The coeﬃcients on most of the demand control variables are highly statistically signiﬁcant
and of the expected sign. However, the sign on small business size is, unexpectedly, negative.
This may indicate a substitution eﬀect, wherein larger small businesses are more likely to have
other ﬁnancing options besides bank loans.15 Similarly, the negative coeﬃcient on the three-year
employment growth rate may be due to greater opportunity for alternative ﬁnancing options in
stronger economies. There also is anecdotal evidence that small businesses may lose employees to
15This is not inconsistent with the SSBF, as long as access to non-bank sources of credit increases more than
access to bank credit as a small business grows.
13larger businesses in economic booms.16.
The coeﬃcients on owner tenure, years since incorporation, unemployment, the ﬁrm failure rate,
and the median family income variable all are negative and statistically signiﬁcant, lending support
to their roles as age and quality measures for purposes of empirical tests for relationship eﬀects.
The negative signs on the age variables also are consistent with the SSBF.
5.2 Relationship Eﬀects
Consistent with Petersen and Rajan, as the proportion of young ﬁrms in the MSA increases, the
marginal eﬀect of an increase in concentration on the volume of small business lending becomes less
negative and eventually turns positive. (Table 3.)For example, using owner tenure to measure ﬁrm
age, concentration increases the volume of small business lending if more than about 11% of the
small businesses have a current owner tenure of less than ﬁve years. About 29% of the MSAs meet
this criterion. But, at the sample mean for owner tenure, an increase in concentration decreases
small business loan volume–a 100 point increase in HHI decreases lending about 0.4%.
There also is some evidence that, controlling for the number of small businesses, increases
in concentration may indeed be associated with a greater proportion of young small businesses.
Numerically, the opposite result is found for the smaller, more concentrated markets, but the
diﬀerences between within-subsample means in those cases are not statistically signiﬁcant. When
the diﬀerence of means is statistically signiﬁcant, for the third quartile, it is the right sign. (Table 4.)
When ﬁrm quality also is allowed to inﬂuence the coeﬃcient on concentration, the relationship
eﬀect due to age remains and an additional statistically signiﬁcant relationship eﬀect, due to the
ﬁrm failure rate, also appears. (Tables 5 and 6.) Now, using owner tenure to measure ﬁrm age, the
estimates in column II of Table 5 indicate about 33% of the MSAs see increases in small business
loan volumes with increases in market concentration.
Given the above results, it is not surprising that statistically signiﬁcant relationship eﬀects due
to ﬁrms being young and low quality also are evident. (Tables 7 and 8.)
16In reference to the San Francisco BayArea: ". . . the slow but steady growth in the Bay Area is ideal for
small ﬁrms, which have trouble hiring qualiﬁed people when the job market gets too hot and employees start eyeing
corporate jobs with fatter paychecks and richer beneﬁts." (Abate (2005))
145.3 Diﬀerential Eﬀects by Level of Concentration
There is no statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the average eﬀects of increases in concen-
tration in markets that are highly concentrated versus those that are not. In addition, when full
ﬁrm age and quality interaction eﬀects are allowed, there is no statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerence in
age-related relationship eﬀects by HHI level. (Table 9.)
However, relationship eﬀects due to the ﬁrm failure rate are marginally statistically signiﬁcantly
stronger when HHI is at least 1,800 than when it is below that level. (Table 9 shows results for
relationship eﬀects using years since incorporation to measure ﬁrm age. Results using owner tenure
are qualitatively similar, including the sign and level of statistical signiﬁcance of the coeﬃcient on
the ﬁrm failure rate interacted with HHI and HIHHI.) Not only is the coeﬃcient when HHI
is high statistically signiﬁcantly greater than when it is not, it turns out that the coeﬃcient when
HHI is high is statistically signiﬁcantly greater than zero, at the one percent level. (Not shown.)
As seen in Table 9, the coeﬃcient on the ﬁrm failure rate interacted with HHI is not statistically
signiﬁcantly greater than zero when HHI is less than 1,800. Therefore, it appears that the quality-
related relationship eﬀects seen in the sample overall are due to eﬀects present only when HHI is
high.
The lack of a statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerence in average eﬀects of HHI between higher and
lower HHI markets may be partially due to sample diﬀerences pertaining to ﬁrm age. As seen in
Table 4, when the number of small businesses is not held constant, the proportion of young ﬁrms
appears to be higher in less concentrated markets. With apparently equal relationship eﬀects due to
ﬁrm age in lower versus higher HHI markets, this sample diﬀerence would tend to make the average
eﬀect of increases in concentration on small business lending less negative in lower versus higher
HHI markets. It turns out that the mean ﬁrm failure rate is very nearly the same in lower (.024)
versus higher (.022) HHI markets, and the diﬀerence is not statistically signiﬁcant. Given this near
equality in ﬁrm failure rates, the presence of an extra relationship eﬀect, due to ﬁrm quality, when
the HHI is at least 1,800, counteracts any tendency, just noted, for relationship eﬀects due to ﬁrm
age to be stronger, and therefore for average HHI eﬀects to be less negative, when the HHI is less
than 1,800 than when it is higher.
155.4 Share Distribution Eﬀects
As explained above, I estimate eﬀects of increases in the sum of squared deviations of market
shares on small business lending only as a robustness check on the ﬁndings indicating the presence
of statistically signiﬁcant SCP eﬀects.
Using the baseline speciﬁcation of equation (4.10), the coeﬃcient on SSD is positive but not
statistically signiﬁcant. However, when full interaction with relationship eﬀects is allowed, the
coeﬃcient on SSD turns negative and becomes marginally statistically signiﬁcant when either the
ﬁrm failure rate or median family income are used as ﬁrm quality proxies.17 (Table 10. Results using
owner tenure to measure ﬁrm age are not shown in Table 10. When owner tenure is used instead
of years since incorporation, only the speciﬁcation using the ﬁrm failure rate shows a statistically
signiﬁcant coeﬃcient on SSD, but it is signiﬁcant at the one percent level.)
The presence of negative and statistically signiﬁcant coeﬃcients on SSD in some speciﬁcations
supports the view that the SCP eﬀects seen when HHI is used to measure market concentration are
not merely due to a negative correlation between HHI and omitted factors that increase the demand
for small business loans. Such correlations would be most likely to work through bank entry and
exit, and these speciﬁcations control for the number of lenders. The statistical signiﬁcance of the
coeﬃcient on SSD is notable, given that equation (4.11) does not have as much structure imposed
on it as the regressions with HHI. As can be seen from equation (4.9), the speciﬁcations with
HHI are equivalent to speciﬁcations with SSD and SCALE FACTOR in which the coeﬃcients
on those two variables are restricted to be the same and the two variables are thus simply summed
and collapsed into one variable, HHI.
6 Conclusion
OLS regressions for MSAs for 2003 and 2004 show that, on average, increases in concentration, as
measured by small loans to small businesses, have a negative and statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect on
17With years since incorporation used to measure ﬁrm age and the ﬁrm failure rate used to measure ﬁrm quality,
the estimates in Table 10 indicate that an increase in SSD, holding SCALE FACTOR constant, would decrease
small business loan volume in about 39% of the MSAs.
16small business loan volumes. This indicates the presence of a traditional structure, conduct, per-
formance eﬀect from increasing market concentration. A number of demand-side control variables,
including, in particular, two employment growth rates, are included in the regression to try to
control for possible endogeneity of the HHI. In addition, estimation of an alternative speciﬁcation,
using the number of lenders and the sum of squared deviations of market shares instead of the HHI,
further supports the view that the presence of statistically signiﬁcant SCP eﬀects is not solely due
to endogeneity bias.
Regression results also suggest the presence of relationship eﬀects in connection with increases
in market concentration. The idea here, from Petersen and Rajan (1995), is that banks with more
market power can better aﬀord to take a gamble on young ﬁrms with poor prospects because such
banks can raise their interest rates in subsequent periods. If ﬁrms are young enough or ﬁrm failure
rates are high enough, as they are for part of the sample, increases in concentration may increase
small business loan volume. It appears, however, that it is just the highly concentrated markets
that are contributing to the existence of relationship eﬀects in connection with ﬁrm quality.
The SCP eﬀects seen on average appear to have some economic signiﬁcance, at least when
judged in relation to the eﬀects of the other important economic conditions variable, employment
growth. On average, an HHI increase of 100 decreases lending about 0.5%. (Table 2, Columns I and
II.) However, this decrease in loan volume is comparable to that engendered by a similar magnitude
decrease (about one-seventh of a standard deviation) in the 1995-2000 payroll employment growth
rate—between 0.9% and 1.3%, as indicated by the same regression estimates.
If a given reduction in bank loans has diﬀerential eﬀects for younger/poorer quality small
businesses than for older/higher quality small businesses, then the welfare implications of the
results presented here are unclear. For example, if younger ﬁrms (or ﬁrms with poorer prospects if
concentration is high) are more dependent on bank loans than are older, survivor ﬁrms, the average
reduction in small business loan volume that arises when concentration increases may hide a net
decline in overall welfare even when there are relatively few young ﬁrms. On the other hand, if an
insuﬃcient proportion of young ﬁrms is destined to survive, anyway, reductions in bank ﬁnancing
for such ﬁrms may not, in fact, be as detrimental to welfare as reductions in bank ﬁnancing for
17established, successful small businesses.
Despite these caveats, the results presented in this paper suggest that the exercise of regulatory
policy aﬀecting concentration in bank small business lending likely is of at least a small amount
of real consequence and that, although, in most instances, the traditional concerns with market
power that arise out of SCP should predominate, regulators should be aware of the possibility of
countervailing beneﬁts for young small businesses or those with relatively poor prospects.
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20Table 1: Sample Statistics
mean standard deviation
small business loans ($000) 291,010 423,244
concentration 1,488 741
number of small businesses 16,839 30,112
small businesses with rev.>$50,000 (proportion of whole) .784 .035
population 640,462 1,133,295
average annual payroll employment growth rate, 1995-2000 .022 .012
average annual payroll employment growth rate, year t-2 to t+1 .009 .016
owner tenure < 5 years (proportion of all small businesses) .073 .07
incorporated < 5 years (proportion of all businesses) .124 .037
unemployment rate 5.689 1.619
failure rate .024 .019
median family income ($) 55,969 9,816



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































22Table 3: Dependent variable: ln(small business loans)
I II
Observations 718 718
Adjusted R2 .819 .823
HHI −1.07x10−4*** −2.43x10−4***
(3.23x10−5) (8.2x10−5)
ln(small bus’s) .378*** .41***
(.064) (.064)




payroll emp. growth, 1995-2000 4.93*** 7.24***
(1.58) (1.65)
payroll emp. growth, t-2 to t+1 -2.87** -1.52
(1.19) (1.22)
owner tenure < 5 yrs -1.86***
(.579)
(owner tenure < 5 yrs)(HHI) 9.36x10−4***
(3.45x10−4)
incorporated < 5 yrs -4.92***
(1.09)




Standard errors in parentheses.
**(***) Statistically signiﬁcant at 5(1) percent level.
23Table 4: Percent of Businesses Incorporated Less Than Five Years













*Statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerence of means, at 10 percent level.
24Table 5: Dependent variable: ln(small business loans)
I II III
ﬁrm quality measure unemployment rate failure rate low income
Observations 718 718 718
Adjusted R2 .84 .827 .82
HHI −8.93x10−5 −1.42x10−4*** −9.92x10−5***
(6.61x10−5) (3.51x10−5) (3.48x10−5)
ln(small bus’s) .203*** .404*** .327***
(.063) (.064) (.066)
lg small bus’s -1.17** -2.45*** -2.28***
(.535) (.561) (.564)
ln(population) .662*** .475*** .537***
(.065) (.067) (.069)
payroll emp. growth, 1995-2000 4.56*** 4.86*** 4.58***
(1.48) (1.56) (1.59)
payroll emp. growth, t-2 to t+1 -3.81*** -3.01*** -2.3*
(1.12) (1.17) (1.2)
owner tenure < 5 yrs -1.56*** -1.06* -1.84***
(.545) (.62) (.583)
(owner tenure < 5 yrs)(HHI) 7.29x10−4** 6.26x10−4* 9.87x10−4***
(3.24x10−4) (3.73x10−4) (3.47x10−4)
ﬁrm quality -.102*** -8.04*** -.065
(.022) (2.23) (.101)
(ﬁrm quality)(HHI) 2.84x10−6 2.81x10−3** −2.63x10−5
(1x10−5) (1.28x10−3) (5.28x10−5)
intercept 3.41*** 4.53*** 4.21***
(.448) (.458) (.463)
Standard errors in parentheses.
*(**)(***) Statistically signiﬁcant at 10(5)(1) percent level.
25Table 6: Dependent variable: ln(small business loans)
I II III
ﬁrm quality measure unemployment rate failure rate low income
Observations 718 718 718
Adjusted R2 .842 .827 .824
HHI −2.19x10−4** −2.49x10−4*** −2.45x10−4***
(9.9x10−5) (8.11x10−5) (8.23x10−5)
ln(small bus’s) .233*** .426*** .357***
(.063) (.063) (.066)
lg small bus’s -1.84*** -3.03*** -3.11***
(.557) (.571) (.577)
ln(population) .641*** .477*** .529***
(.065) (.066) (.068)
payroll emp. growth, 1995-2000 5.97*** 6.93*** 6.89***
(1.57) (1.64) (1.66)
payroll emp. growth, t-2 to t+1 -3** -1.81 -.856
(1.16) (1.2) (1.23)
incorporated < 5 yrs -3.77*** -3.83*** -5***
(1.03) (1.12) (1.08)
(incorporated < 5 yrs)(HHI) 1.41x10−3** 1.23x10−3* 1.7x10−3***
(6.19x10−4) (6.75x10−4) (6.53x10−4)
ﬁrm quality -.099*** -7.57*** -.093
(.022) (2.12) (.099)
(ﬁrm quality)(HHI) 3.39x106−6 2.87x10−3** −1.29x10−5
(9.97x10−6) (1.21x10−3) (5.17x10−5)
intercept 4.22*** 5.1*** 5.13***
(.446) (.445) (.452)
Standard errors in parentheses.
*(**)(***) Statistically signiﬁcant at 10(5)(1) percent level.
26Table 7: Dependent variable: ln(small business loans)
I II III
ﬁrm quality measure unemployment rate failure rate low income
Observations 718 718 718
Adjusted R2 .84 .822 .82
HHI −4.25x10−5** −7.08x10−5*** −6.89x10−5***
(2.5x10−5) (2.63x10−5) (2.67x10−5)
ln(small bus’s) .201*** .408*** .335***
(.063) (.065) (.067)
lg small bus’s -1.19** -2.49*** -2.3***
(.536) (.565) (.564)
ln(population) .655*** .462*** .512***
(.065) (.068) (.069)
payroll emp. growth, 1995-2000 4.64*** 4.93*** 4.37***
(1.48) (1.59) (1.59)
payroll emp. growth, t-2 to t+1 -3.7*** -2.76** -2.09*
(1.13) (1.17) (1.2)
owner tenure < 5 yrs -.554** -.17 -.31
(.263) (.292) (.279)
ﬁrm quality -.101*** -3.47*** -.09**
(.01) (.94) (.043)
lowest quartile for ﬁrm age and quality -.116 7 -.216** -.449***
(.118) (.105) (.174)
(lowest quartile for ﬁrm age and quality)(HHI) 1.2x10−4* 1.55x10−4** 2.07x10−4***
(6.69x10−5) (6.42x10−5) (8.33x10−5)
intercept 3.47*** 4.59*** 4.41***
(.433) (.462) (.458)
Standard errors in parentheses.
*(**)(***) Statistically signiﬁcant at 10(5)(1) percent level.
27Table 8: Dependent variable: ln(small business loans)
I II III
ﬁrm quality measure unemployment rate failure rate low income
Observations 718 718 718
Adjusted R2 .842 .826 .826
HHI −4.4x10−5* −6.82x10−5*** −6.07x10−5***
(2.47x10−5) (2.61x10−5) (2.61x10−5)
ln(small bus’s) .225*** .422*** .352***
(.063) (.064) (.066)
lg small bus’s -1.9*** -3.1*** -3.1***
(.579) (.574) (.574)
ln(population) .645*** .476*** .525***
(.065) (.066) (.067)
payroll emp. growth, 1995-2000 6.02*** 7.01*** 6.31***
(1.57) (1.64) (1.66)
payroll emp. growth, t-2 to t+1 -3.08*** -1.57 -.562
(1.17) (1.21) (1.23)
incorporated < 5 yrs -1.88*** -1.98*** -2.08***
(.579) (.639) (.6)
ﬁrm quality -.098*** -2.54*** -.066
(.01) (.923) (.042)
lowest quartile for ﬁrm age and quality -.158 -.286*** -.633***
(.126) (.104) (.178)
(lowest quartile for ﬁrm age and quality)(HHI) 1.58x10−4** 1.64x10−4*** 2.17x10−4***
(7.27x10−5) (6.01x10−5) (8.38x10−5)
intercept 4.07*** 4.92*** 4.88***
(.423) (.437) (.435)
Standard errors in parentheses.
*(**)(***) Statistically signiﬁcant at 10(5)(1) percent level.
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